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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20010416-CA

vs.
ROLLO KENT BICKLEY,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
• •

•

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appealsfroma conviction for criminal nonsupport, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in ordering that defendant make restitution for all child

support arrearages where defendant agreed to a "total victim restitution" order for all child
support arrearages in the plea agreement?
Standard of Review. "An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's restitution
order 'unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion.'" State v.
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, % 7,12 P.3d 110 (quoting State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 653
(Utah App. 1997)), cert, denied, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001)).
1

2.

Did the trial court violate defendant's constitutional rights in taking his guilty

plea?
Standard of Review. "[T]he ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly
complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,433 (Utah
1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999),
reproduced in Addendum A, are relevant to a determination of this case.1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
Charges. Defendant was charged with one count of criminal nonsupport in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999). R. 1-2. The State alleged that the offense was
committed "in each of eighteen months of a twenty-four month period and/or by having a
total child support arrearage [ ] in excess of $10,000," thus enhancing the offense to a third
degree felony. R. 1. Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial
as charged. R. 31-36. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(5), defendant filed a notice
of his intention to claim the affirmative defense of inability to provide support. R. 39.

'Because the 2001 amendment to section 76-3-201(2) does not affect the analysis
of the issues on appeal here, the State has reproduced Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp.
2001) in Addendum A.
2

A separate summary of facts upon which the conviction was based is not included
because defendant did not go to trial on the matter and did not include a transcript of the
preliminary hearing in the record on appeal.
2

Pre-trial Motions. Defendant filed a motion asking the court to declare section 76-7201 unconstitutional, or in the alternative, to limit the "total arrearage" to the time specified
in the Information. R. 144-76.3 Defendant's motion focused in part on the provision in
section 76-7-201 which enhances criminal nonsupport to a third degree felony based on a
"total arrearage [ ] in excess of $10,000." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(3). Defendant
argued that the arrearage is limited to the period charged in the information. R. 148. The
State argued that the arrearage enhancement is an "attendant circumstance" and that the State
need only prove that the defendant "knowingly failed to provide support for his children
when they were in need, and did so when he had a total arrearage of more than $10,000."
R. 203. The court agreed with defendant, holding that the State was required to prove that
the criminal nonsupport was committed "as a result of which the total arrearage is in excess
of $10,000." R. 260. The trial court's ruling effectively precluded the State from
introducing evidence of arrearages accrued prior to February 1997.
Plea Bargain. Five months after the trial court's ruling, the parties entered a plea
agreement resolving the case. The State agreed to amend the information reducing the
criminal nonsupport offense to a class A misdemeanor and to recommend probation rather
than jail. R. 347; R. 515:2-3,15; R. 471: 8. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the reduced
charge, foregoing hisrightto a trial. R. 340-52; R. 515. He also agreed "that total victim

3

Defendant also filed a motion asking the trial court to exclude any evidence of
defendant's failure to pay child support before the date specified in the
Information—February 1, 1997. R. 136-41. No decision on that motion appears in the
record.
3

restitution be entered in the amount of [his] obligation for child support arrears that [he]
owe[d] [his] children, with the understanding that the amount of court ordered restitution and
monthly [payments] remain to be determined by the court/' R. 340-52,515. Consistent with
the plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to criminal nonsupport. In entering his plea,
defendant admitted that without good reason, he knowingly failed to provide for the financial
support of his minor children, who were in needy circumstances, between February 1,1997
and January 10,2000. R. 340-52; R. 515.
Sentencing. Two weeks after the trial court accepted the plea agreement, defendant
moved to limit restitution to child support payments owing from February 1,1997 through
January 1,2000, less any amounts paid during that period. R. 354-66. The trial court denied
defendant's motion and sentenced him to a one-year jail term and a $2,500 fine. R. 410-15;
R. 416-17. The court then suspended the fine and three months of the jail term and placed
defendant on supervised probation for three years. R. 416-17. As a condition of probation,
the court ordered defendant to pay all child support arrearages at the rate of $1,000 per
month. R. 417.4 The trial court ordered defendant to report to the jail eight months later
subject to a review hearing the day preceding. R. 416-17. Defendant timely appealed. R.
418.
Post-judgment Proceedings. In accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(iii)
(1999), the trial court entered the order of restitution on the civil judgment docket. R. 4454

Nearly five months later, the trial court entered a Sentencing Order consistent
with the original sentence except that it reduced the restitution orderfrom$32,024 to
$31,567.98. Compare R. 416-17 with R. 465-68.
4

46. On October 31,2001, the trial court revoked the original probation order and reinstated
probation on all of the same terms and conditions but two. R. 494-97. The court reduced the
monthly restitution payments to $400 and set back seven months the date defendant was
required to report to the jail. R. 495.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Restitution Order. Defendant contends that the trial court's restitution order
should have been limited to the child support arrearages accrued during the period charged
in the criminal information. However, defendant agreed to a complete restitution order for
all child support arrearages, without limitation to the date accrued. He also agreed to leave
for the trial court the determination of court-ordered restitution—the amount of complete
restitution that would attach as part of his criminal sentence. Accordingly, the trial court
properly ordered defendant to make restitution for all child support arrearages.
Even if the Court were to accept defendant's assertion that he understood the plea
agreement to be otherwise, that misunderstanding does not entitle defendant to a restitution
order that comports with his misunderstanding. Rather, the plea should be vacated, placing
the parties in the same position they were in before the plea agreement.
II. Guilty Plea. Defendant contends that his constitutional rights were violated
because the trial court did not properly "canvass" him about the plea agreement. On the
contrary, the trial court adequately queried defendant regarding his rights and his
understanding of the plea agreement. His constitutional rights were not therefore violated.

5

ARGUMENT
L
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED RESTITUTION FOR ALL
CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to make restitution for
all child support arrearages, amounting to more than $30,000, rather than for the child
support arrearages accrued between February 1997 and January 2000, amounting to just over
$11,000. Aplt. Brf. at 13-19. For the reasons explained below, that claim lacks merit.
A.

RESTITUTION UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201.

The trial court's authority to order restitution is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201 (1999). Under that statute, "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the [trial]
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in [the
statute], or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a
plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i).
1.

Complete Restitution and Court-ordered Restitution.

Restitution is defined as "full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to
a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, and
payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation

" Utah

Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(d). Restitution under the statute is divided into two parts:
"complete restitution and court-ordered restitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(c).

6

"Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all
losses caused by the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(c)(i). In calculating
complete restitution, the trial court considers all relevant facts, including the cost of the
damage or loss, any resulting medical or related professional services, and any lost income.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(b). The statute requires the trial court to enter the complete
restitution amount on the civil judgment docket. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(iii).
Complete restitution, therefore, is not made part of the criminal sentence, but operates as a
civil judgment.
In contrast, court-ordered restitution is "the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as part of the criminal sentence at the time of
sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(c)(ii) (emphasis added). In other words, it is
the amount of complete restitution that attaches as part of the criminal sentence. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(d). After complete restitution is determined, the trial court
considers the following factors in determining what amount will be made part of criminal
sentencing as court-ordered restitution:
(i) thefinancialresources of the defendant and the burden that payment
of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis
or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution
and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution
inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(c).

7

Court-ordered restitution may be in an amount equal to complete restitution or some
amount less than complete restitution, depending on the court's assessment of the
aforementioned factors. SeeMonsonv. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1028 (Utah 1996). The trial
court may decline to impose court-ordered restitution altogether or may defer entering such
an order, but only "if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under [the statute],
substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the victim." Utah Code Ann. § 763-201(4)(d).
2.

Circumstances Requiring the Trial Court to Order Restitution.

As noted, "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages,... the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims
of crime as provided in [the statute]/* Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). A victim is
defined as any person who "has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's
criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i). Those criminal activities,
however, need not necessarily be the criminal activities for which defendant was convicted.
They also include "any other conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(b); accord State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, f t 3, 987 P.2d
1289. Thus, restitution may be ordered for pecuniary damages resulting from both the crime
for which defendant was convicted and any other criminal conduct to which defendant has
admitted responsibility at sentencing. See Watson, 1999 UT App 273, at tf 3,5. The statute
8

also permits the court to order restitution in a third circumstance. The trial court may order
restitution "for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a
plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i); accord Aplt. Brf. at 13.
B,

DEFENDANT AGREED TO A RESTITUTION ORDER FOR ALL CHILD SUPPORT
ARREARAGES AS PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT.

Because he pled guilty to criminal nonsupport between February 1,1997 and January
10, 2000, defendant concedes that the first circumstance requiring restitution was
present—he was convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages. See Aplt. Brf. at
13,17. The State concedes that the second circumstance was not present—defendant did not
admit responsibility for criminal nonsupport before February 1,1997. Accordingly, only the
third circumstance is at issue on appeal—whether or not defendant agreed to a restitution
order for all of his child support arrearages as part of his plea agreement.
Following the restitution hearing, the trial court made the following finding:
In return for allowing defendant to plead to the lesser offense, and the State's
commitment to recommend suspension of jail time, defendant agreed that
complete restitution be entered in the total amount of his obligation for child
support arrears. It was agreed that the amount of court-ordered restitution
would remain for the Court's determination.
R. 412.5 Defendant takes issue with that finding on appeal, alleging that he "never agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement." Aplt. Brf. at 17 (internal quotes omitted).
According to defendant, "[t]he only provision in the written plea agreement that even hints
of an admission was [his] statement that he 6agree[d] that total victim restitution be entered

The trial court's Memorandum Decision is reproduced in Addendum B.
9

in the amount of [his] obligation for child support arrears."' Apit. Brf. at 17 (third bracket
in original). He asserts that "[i]f anything, the written plea agreement demonstrates that [he]
only agreed to pay restitution for the dates specified in the Information" because he only
admitted to criminal nonsupport between February 1997 and January 2000. Aplt. Brf. at 1718. Defendant's argument belies both the facts and the law.
1.

The Plea Affidavit Supports the Trial Court's Finding That
Defendant Agreed to a Restitution Order for All Child Support
Arrearages.

Defendant signed a plea affidavit acknowledging his guilt, waiving hisrightto a trial
and other constitutional rights, and agreeing to the terms of the plea bargain. R. 342-52.6
The plea affidavit set forth the terms of the plea agreement as follows:
The State will move to amend Count I of the information to charge the offense
alleged as a class "A" misdemeanor. I will plead guilty to the Count I of the
Information and agree that total victim restitution be entered in the amount of
my obligation for child support arrears that I owe my children, with the
understanding that the amount of court ordered restitution and monthly remain
to be determined by the court.
R. 347 (emphasis added).
The agreement thus addressed both complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.
Defendant unequivocally agreed to the entry of a "total" or complete restitution award "in
the amount of [his] obligation for child support arrears." R. 347. The agreement did not
limit that amount to the period charged, nor did it limit it to damages resulting from conduct
to which defendant pled guilty. Had defendant wished to limit restitution, he could have so
6

The plea affidavit, entitled "Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel and
Order," is reproduced in Addendum C.
10

provided in the plea agreement. He did not. Defendant also expressly agreed to permit the
trial court to detennine what amount of complete restitution would be made part of
sentencing as court-ordered restitution. In other words, while defendant agreed to a "total"
or complete restitution award "in the amount of [his] obligation for child support arrears,"
he agreed to leave for the court the determination of "the amount of court ordered restitution
and monthly [payments]." R. 347 (emphasis added). As explained, supra, at 7, that amount
depends on an evaluation of the factors identified in section 76-3-20 l(8)(c).
2.

The Trial Court Established That Defendant Understood the
Consequences of the Plea Agreement

Notwithstanding the plain language in the affidavit, defendant complains that the trial
court did not properly "canvass" him to assure that he understood the consequences of his
plea under the plea agreement. Aplt Brf. at 17,19-23. A review of the plea hearing reveals
otherwise.
Under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court may not accept a
guilty plea until it has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived therightto counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of therightto the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, therightto a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, therightto confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, theserightsare waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
11

(B) there is a factual basis for the plea
;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). "[T]he substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know
of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead
guilty." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11,22 P.3d 1242. The trial court's rule 11 findings
"may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, an affidavit reciting
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and
acknowledged the contents of the affidavit." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e); accord Visser, 2000
UT 88, at f 12. The trial court did both.
The plea affidavit covered each of the requirements set forth in rule 11. See R. 34252. The affidavit established that defendant understood therightsidentified in rule 11, the
nature and elements of the offense, the sentence that may be imposed, and the terms of the
plea agreement R. 343-48*. It further established that by pleading guilty, defendant
understood that he waived thoserightsand admitted to all the elements of the offense. See
R. 343-49. Before defendant signed the affidavit, the trial court verified that defendant reads,
writes, and speaks English fluently, that he was not then under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or medication that would affect his ability to think clearly, and that he did not suffer

12

from a mental illness. R. 515:6-7. The court verified that defendant read the plea affidavit
containing the plea terms and reviewed it with his attorney. R. 515: 4, 7-8. Defendant
represented to the court that he understood "each and every provision of that document" and
that he had no questions of his attorney concerning the agreement. R. 515: 7-8.
The trial court also independently questioned defendant as to each of the rights
identified in rule 11. R. 515:9-12. Defendant acknowledged that he understood the nature
and elements of the offense and the rights he waived by pleading guilty. R. 515: 8-11. He
stated that he understood the possible sentence, including the requirement of restitution. R.
515:8-11. That he would be held responsible for the child support he had not paid was also
specifically discussed:
The Court:
And in addition to the fine and jail sentence if there
has been an economic loss as a result of this offense he
may be ordered to pay restitution. And actually that's a
sure thing in this case.
[Prosecutor]:

Yes.

The Court:

Virtually because restitution is the child support that
you did not pay before; do you understand?

Defendant:

I do.

The Court

All right. So you can—that is the concept of restitution
in this case; is that clear to you?
Yes, it is.

Defendant:

R. 515: 11-12. Thus, defendant acknowledged that he would be held responsible for the
child support that he "did not pay before." R. 515: 12. As in the plea affidavit, no qualifiers
were suggested. Finally, defendant affirmed that his guilty plea was voluntary. R. 515: 13.
13

The record thus provides "an adequate basis... to conclude that the trial court strictly
complied with rule 11." See Visser, 2000 UT 88, at f 13. In doing so, the trial court ensured
that defendant understood hisrightsand "the basic consequences of [his] decision to plead
guilty," e.g., the terms of the plea bargain. Id. at f 12. Defendant's claim that the trial court
did not properly "canvass" him about the plea agreement must therefore fail.
3.

Both the Prosecutor and Defense Counsel Acknowledged That
Restitution for All Child Support Arrearages Was Contemplated
under the Plea Agreement

After the plea hearing but before sentencing, defendant submitted a Sentencing
Memorandum suggesting that restitution must be limited to the child support arrearages for
the period charged—February 1997 to January 2002. See R. 359-60. In a responsive
memorandum, the State reiterated the terms of the plea agreement:
In return for allowing defendant to plead to the lesser offense, and the state's
commitment to recommend suspension of any jail time, defendant agreed that
complete restitution be entered in the total amount of his obligation for child
support arrears, unfettered by the period of violation alleged in the
Information. It was agreed that the amount of court-ordered restitution would
remain for the court's determination.
R. 369 (emphasis added). The State further noted that the only remaining issue for the court
after the simple calculation of arrearages was "the portion ofthe complete restitution that the
defendant will be called upon to pay as part of his sentence" R. 372 (emphasis added).
Not only was the State's position here consistent with the plea affidavit, it was
consistent with the nature of a plea bargain as a "mutually desirable agreement." State v.
West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah App. 1988). The State had charged defendant with felony

14

criminal nonsupport, alleging that he committed the crime "in each of eighteen months of a
twenty-four month period and/or by having a total child support arrearage [ ] in excess of
$10,000." R. 1. The State's felony case against defendant was strong. The State's evidence
would demonstrate that defendant accrued child support arrearages in excess of $10,000
between February 1997 and January 2000 and that no support payments were made in at least
34 months of the 36-month period. See R. 391-92. Indeed, defendant admitted as much in
the plea affidavit. See R. 345-46,360-61.7 However, because the trial court had ruled that
any child support arrearages accrued before the dates charged in the Information were
irrelevant, R. 257-63, a simple conviction would not result in a restitution order for all child
support arrearages. Accordingly, the State was willing to forego a felony conviction if
defendant agreed to a restitution order for all child support arrearages. An agreement that
would otherwise limit restitution to the period charged would have been of no benefit to the
State. Likewise, defendant, who never denied that he owed the child support, was willing
to agree to a restitution order for all child support arrearages in exchange for a reduced
conviction and a recommendation of probation.
At the ensuing restitution hearing, defense counsel conceded that the terms of the plea
agreement were as represented by the prosecutor:

7

Defendant conceded below that his child support obligation during that three-year
period was $11,725 and he paid only $311.58, leaving a child support arrearage of
$11,413.42 for that period, not including interest. See R. 360-61.
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[Defense counsel]: . . . The one thing that might need some argument is:
There's a portion where you have the complete
restitution and then court ordered restitution and the
factors to consider under court ordered restitution are
sort of on a case-by-case analysis.... I guess my only
request to you is that if you feel like you might need
some more information or testimony, that you could let
us know.
The Court:

Not at all. And when you speak of restitution, do you use
that word synonymously with "arrears"?

[Defense counsel]: No, Judge.
The Court:
[Prosecutor]:

All right. Do you?
Well, other than the agreement in this case was that
restitution would be the amount that he owes, the total
amount. The complete restitution would be the total
amount that he owes.

The Court:

of child support arrearage?

[Prosecutor]:

Yes.

The Court:

All right.

[Defense counsel]: And, Judge, just so I can—so the Court doesn't think I'm
deceiving: We had an agreement that we would agree to
the complete restitution amount as the State had it
without—we would have—what would be left would be
the court ordered restitution, which is the amount that
attaches as part of his probation. So, our agreement
wasn't that we could fight over it all or not fight over it
aH, but that the one we would agree to, the complete
amount, and that court ordered we would leave up to the
judge to decide.
R. 470: 3-4 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to his claim on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 17,
defendant understood that "total restitution" meant "complete restitution" and that complete
restitution was to be awarded for all child support arrearages under the plea agreement. With
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the parties in agreement on the amount of complete restitution, they left for the trial court the
"case-by-case analysis" of determining court-ordered restitution, or in other words, the
appropriate amount of complete restitution "that attaches as part of [defendant's] probation."
R. 470: 3-4. Counsel did not suggest that the court-ordered restitution was limited to the
period charged, nor could she given the agreement and the law. Rather, as discussed above,
that amount depended on an evaluation of defendant's financial resources, the burden
restitution would place on him, his ability to make installment payments, the rehabilitative
effect of restitution, and any other applicable circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(8)(c).8
* * *

In summary, the trial court's finding that the parties agreed to a complete restitution
order in the amount of all child support arrearages, but leaving for the court to determine
what amount should be part of the sentence as court-ordered restitution, was supported by
the express terms of the plea affidavit, the stated understanding of defendant at the plea
hearing, and the statements ofboth the prosecutor and defense counsel. Defendant has failed
to demonstrate that these findings were clearly erroneous. Cf. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d
1219,1223 (Utah 1997) (holding that a trial court's "credibility determinations are subject
to a clearly erroneous standard of review"). Because defendant agreed to pay restitution for
all child support arrearages, the trial court's restitution order did not exceed that prescribed
by law or otherwise constitute an abuse of discretion. See Weeks, 2002 UT App 273, at f 7.
8

Defendant has not challenged the court's application of those factors on appeal.
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C.

SHOULD THIS COURT FIND THAT DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE PLEA
AGREEMENT TO LIMIT RESTITUTION TO THE CHARGED PERIOD, DEFENDANT'S
RELIEF IS VACATION OF THE PLEA.

Assuming arguendo that this Court finds that defendant understood the plea agreement
to limit restitution to child support arrearages accrued during the charged period, the
appropriate remedy is not to conform the sentence to defendant's misunderstanding. Rather,
the plea should be vacated, placing the parties in the same position they were in before entry
of the plea.
Utah courts have consistently vacated guilty pleas where the defendant did not
understand, or was not otherwise properly advised of, the possible sentence that may be
imposed. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464,466 (Utah 1989) (vacating the defendant's
guilty plea because the record did not show that he was informed about the sentence that may
be imposed); State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772,778 (Utah App.) (recognizing that "the failure
to inform a defendant of the punishments possible is fatal to a guilty plea conviction"), cert
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); West, 765 P.2d at 896 (recognizing that a defendant may
withdraw a guilty plea if was misinformed as to the true nature and degree of the offense).
Here, defendant seeks to go a step further, asking the court to enforce the plea bargain as
only understood by him. A defendant has no constitutionalrighttaa plea bargain in the first
instance, much less one dictated entirely in his favor. See United States v. Hernandez, 948
F.2d 316,325 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that u[t]he government is not required to plea bargain
with defendants or defendants' attorneys"); see also State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,
f 14, 17 P.3d 1153 (holding that the court is not required to approve a plea agreement).
18

Accordingly, as explained by this Court in State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,387 (Utah App.
1997), cert denied, 451 U.S. 984,101 S.Ct. 2316 (1981)), rescission or vacation of the plea
agreement is the appropriate remedy where, as here, "the defendant seeks to withdraw from
a portion of a plea agreement or otherwise unilaterally modify the agreement."
Occasionally, courts have enforced a plea agreement notwithstanding a
misunderstanding of the parties. Such was the case in Patience. In that case, "the parties
negotiated a plea agreement under which defendant agreed to plead guilty to three counts of
attempted forgery, third degree felonies. At the time of the plea agreement, both parties were
apparently unaware of the [statutory] amendments reducing forgery to a third degree felony,
and attempted forgery to a class A misdemeanor." Id. (internal citations omitted). On
appeal, the State conceded that the sentence for third degree felonies was illegal, but argued
that the plea agreement should be vacated based on the parties' mutual mistake. Id. at 384.
The Court rejected the State's argument, holding that "the State bore the risk of the
mistake as to the law in effect at the time the parties entered into the plea agreement." Id.
at 388. The Court observed that "[t]he State is generally in the better position to know the
correct law, given the State has control over the charges in the information and final say over
whether to accept a defendant's plea, and the State must be deemed to know the law it is
enforcing." Id. Moreover, the Court reasoned, "[t]he State must be charged with knowledge
of its own legislative enactments and, in that sense, cannot be said to have been mistaken
about the governing statute in effect when it agreed to the plea agreement." Id. The Court
thus concluded that "[p]lacing the burden on the State to be aware of the current provisions
19

of the Utah statute under which defendant was charged is consistent with the constitutional
concerns involved in plea agreements." Id.
The State cannot be charged with the risk of mistake here. As explained above, the
plea affidavit supports both the State's and trial court's understanding of the plea agreement,
as do the statements of the prosecutor and defense counsel. Whereas the State may be
charged with knowing the law, it cannot be charged with knowing a defendant's subjective
understanding of a plea agreement, especially where that understanding is unreasonable in
light of the terms of the agreement, the defendant's representations at the plea hearing, and
defense counsel's acknowledgments at the restitution hearing. Therefore, if this Court
accepts defendant's allegation that he understood the agreement differently, it should not
enforce that misunderstanding, but should vacate the plea, returning the parties to the same
position they were in before the plea was entered.
II.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED IS BASED ON THE FALSE PREMISE THAT THE COURT DID
NOT PROPERLY "CANVASS" HIM ABOUT THE PLEA AGREEMENT
In his second claim on appeal, defendant contends that because the trial court did not
properly "canvass" him about the plea agreement, his constitutional rights were violated.
Aplt. Brf. at 17,19-23.* As discussed, supra, at 11-14, the trial court made a thorough and
defendant contends that the following rights were violated: his due process right
to notice of the charges against him, his right to a preliminary hearing, hisrightto be free
from multiple punishments, his right to the presumption of innocence, his right to require
the State to prove all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and hisrightto a
trial by jury. Aplt. Brf. at 19-23.
20

proper inquiry of defendant at the plea hearing and concluded that his plea was knowingly
and voluntarily made. Accordingly, defendant's second claim on appeal must also fail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

1
76-3-201. Definitions - Sentences or combination of sentences allowed - Civil penalties Restitution - Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting
the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,
including the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, and payment for
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages
as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of
an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
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(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for which the
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of restitution,
a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the cleric of the court shall enter an order
of complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide
notice of the order to the parties*
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered may seek enforcement
of the restitution order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the
Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution order is
entered, enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or
department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket
and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to
be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance
with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition,
to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which
he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that
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the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in
Subsection (4Xc),
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses
caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be
entitled to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the
victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket
and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be
credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the
court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation
expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant
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is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be
calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in
writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other
reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at
the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the
upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding
aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child, object
rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes substantial
bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and
admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be
sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offenSe, the offense shall include any
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant
agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
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defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court
shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of
property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to
physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered
in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; the cost
of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the
victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a
victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to befixedby the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of
payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of restitution if the
court determines that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of
considering an order of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 1981,
ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 1987, ch.
107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19; 1995, ch.
I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 1;
1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2,3; 1998, ch. 149, § 1; 1999, ch. 270, §
15; 2001, ch. 209, § 1 .
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment by ch. 111, effective May 1,1995, added "or for conduct
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement1* and made a related
change in Subsection (4)(aX»).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective May 1,1995, inserted "the accrual of interest from the time
of sentencing" in Subsection (1)(d), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "person convicted" in Subsection
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(2), and added Subsections (4)(a)(iii) and (4)(d)(iii).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in Subsection
(4)(c)" at the end of Subsection (1)(d); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the criteria and procedures for
ordering restitution; added Subsection (8); and made several stylistic changes.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2)(g), redesignated
former Subsection (2)(g) as Subsection (2)(h), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc), requiring sentencing
to the aggravated mandatory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to children during the commission of
child kidnapping or various listed child sexual assaults.
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996* for "May 1,
1995" in Subsection (2)(g).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(g), which
read: "on or after April 29, 1996, to imprisonment at not less than five years and which may be for life for
an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1 and 76-5-302; or" and redesignated
former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(g); deleted former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing of a
defendant subject to mandatory sentencing under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective April 29,1996, in Subsection (2)(b) substituted "removal or
disqualification from" for "removal from or disqualification of and in Subsection (4)(a)(i) added "Section"
before "77-37-2."
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3, effective April 29,1996, added Subsections (4)(a)(vii)
and (4)(d)(iv).
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, in Subsection (4XaXi) substituted "Subsection (1)(e)"
for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and family member has the meaning as defined in Section 77-37-2"
from the end and changed the style of the internal references in Subsections (5XcX0. (5)(cK»i). and (8)(c).
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection (6Xe), substituted "aggravating and
mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission" for "Commission
on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" and made stylistic changes.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, deleted former Subsection (2)(e) which read "to life
imprisonment," redesignating existing Subsections (2X0 and (g) as (2)(e) and (f)Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1995, ch. 301, § 6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to Subsection
(4)(a)(iii) shall merge into this section, as amended by ch. 301, as Subsection (4Xa)(vi).
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1, 1995; however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amendment of
this section by ch. 337 until April 29,1996.
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1
76-7-201. Criminal nonsupport
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or children under the
age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support of the spouse, child, or children
when any one of them:
(a) is in needy circumstances; or
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a source other than the
defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor:
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this state, any other state,
or any court of the United States;
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any 24-month
period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000.
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock whose paternity
has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a civil suit.
(5) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an affirmative
defense that the accused is unable to provide support- Voluntary unemployment or
underemployment by the defendant does not give rise to that defense.
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve on the prosecuting
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim the affirmative defense of inability to
provide support. The notice shall specifically identify the factual basis for the defense and the
names and addresses of the witnesses who the defendant proposes to examine in order to
establish the defense.
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in Subsection (5)(b), or at
such other time as the court may direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve the defendant
with a notice containing the names and addresses of the witnesses who the state proposes to
examine in order to contradict or rebut the defendant's claim.
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (5)(b) or (5Xc) entitles the
opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation. If the courtfindsthat a party's failure to
comply is the result of bad faith, it may impose appropriate sanctions.
History: C. 1953,76-7-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 21; 1995,
ch.289,§l;1999,ch.89,§l.
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Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, changed "sixteen" to "18" and
deleted "and without just cause" after "knowingly" in Subsection (1); added "or any court of the United
States" in Subsection (3)(a); added Subsection (6); and made stylistic changes.
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, divided Subsection (1), adding the Subsection (1)(a)
designation; added Subsection (1)(b); substituted "outside of Utah" for "in another state" in Subsection
(3)(b); added Subsection (3)(c); deleted former Subsection (5) which read "In a prosecution under this
section, it is no defense that the person to be supported received necessary support from a source other
than the defendant," redesignating Subsection (6) as (5); and made related and stylistic changes
throughout the section.
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Addendum B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

i

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 991912861FS
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne
March 30, 2001

ROLLO KENT BICKLEY,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
defendant's Motion to Determine and Limit Restitution.

The Court

heard oral argument with respect to the motion on March 9, 2001.
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the
following ruling.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201:
(4) (a) (I) When a person is convicted of
criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution to victims
of crime as provided in this subsection, or
for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a
victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection (1)(e)*
(4) (ii) In determining whether restitution is
appropriate, the court shall follow the
criteria and procedures as provided in
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Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d)
(4)(c) In determining restitution, the court
shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution
necessary to compensate a victim for all
losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the
restitution
the
court
having
criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a
part of the criminal sentence at the time of
sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (8).
(8) (a)
For the purpose of determining
restitution for an offense, the offense shall
include any criminal conduct admitted by the
defendant to the sentencing court or to which
the defendant agrees to pay restitution.
(b> In determining the monetary sum and other
conditions for complete restitution, the court
shall consider all relevant facts. . .
(c)In determining the monetary sum and other
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the
court shall consider the factors listed in
Subsection (8)(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant
and the burden that payment of restitution
will impose, with regard to the other
obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay
restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the
defendant of the payment of restitution and
the method of payment; and'
(iv)

other

circumstances

which

the

court
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determines make restitution inappropriate.
This action charged defendant with criminal non-support as a
third degree felony for his failure to provide support for his
children for the period February 1, 1991, through January 10, 2000,
by a twice amended information.

Defendant subsequently plead

guilty to the offense as a class A misdemeanor.

In return for

allowing defendant to plead to the lesser offense, and the State's
commitment to recommend suspension of jail time, defendant agreed
that complete restitution be entered in the total amount of his
obligation for child support arrears.

It was agreed that the

amount of court-ordered restitution would remain for the Court's
determination.
In light of the aforementioned, and after reviewing the record
in this matter, the Court is persuaded restitution, in the total
amount of defendant's obligation for child support arrears, should
be reimbursed to both the State and the custodial parent for their
losses suffered as a result of defendant's failure to make his
support payments.
With specific regard to recovery by the State, it is clear
that for the greater portion of time during which defendant's
arrears accrued, Vickie Lynn Bickley has been receiving public
assistance. That assistance was provided under what is now Utah's
Family Employment Program.

A condition of receiving assistance

STATE v. BICKLEY
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under the program required the custodial parent to assign to the
state any right to receive support due from others which accrues
during the period in which assistance is provided.

The collection

of these monies is through the Office of Recovery Services, which
is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-106(1) to file judicial
proceedings to enforce support orders "in the name of the state,
any department of the state, the office [of Recovery Services] or
an obligee." Further, subsection (3) goes on to provide that "any
order that includes a money judgment for support to be paid an
obligee by any person is considered to be in favor of the office
[of Recovery Services] to the extent of the amount of the office's
right to recover public assistance from the judgment debtor."l
Finally, turning to the issue of whether the amount of
pecuniary damages that the Court may order Mr. Bickley to pay is
limited by the eight-year civil statute of limitation, after
reviewing the statute, the legislative history, and the available
case law, the Court is persuaded such civil statutes of limitations
do not apply in determining victim restitution.Based upon the forgoing, defendant's motion is respectfully,
denied.

Moreover, the fact that the State is not named as a victim
in this case is irrelevant. See State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417,
421-22 (1987), where restitution was ordered in favor of victims
not named in the information.

STATE v. BICKLEY
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day of March, 2001.
BY THE COURT

PST B. BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT
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NICHOLAS J. ANGELIDES #4176
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for the plaintiff
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Telephone: (801) 366-0199
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT,
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
ROLLO KENT BICKLEY,

Criminal No. 991912861FS
Judge: Arme M. Stirba

Defendant.

ROLLO KENT BICKLEY, the defendant in this case, state as follows with
respect to my entry of plea of guilty in the above-captioned case:
The charges to which 1 am pleading guilty
I hereby confirm the entry of my voluntary plea of guilty to the following:

CRIME

DEGREE

POSSIBLE
MAXIMUM
SENTENCE

3^

Count I: Criminal Non-Support

Class" A" Misdemeanor

365 Days Jail Prison

UCA §76-7-201

$2,500 Fine

I have received a copy of the charge against me alleged in Count I of the
INFORMATION herein, I have read it and I understand the nature and elements of the
offense for which I am pleading guilty.
Ruie 11 Utah Rules of Criminal procedure Advice
Rule 11(e)(1) representation by counsel,
I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that an
attomey will be appointed to represent me by the Court at no cost to me if I cannot afford
one. I have not waived myrightto legal counsel. My attorney has been appointed and my
attorney is Marnie D. Flores of Salt Lake Legal Defenders. I have had an opportunity to
discuss this statement, myrightsand the consequences of my pleas with my attorney prior
to the execution andfilingof this statement and the entry of my plea before this Court. I am
satisfied with my attorney and my attorney's advice.
Rule H(eX2) voluntary pleas.
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I know I do not have to plead guilty to
anything. I want to enter this guilty plea and I have decided to do so of my ownfreewill.
Rule 11(e)(3) presumption of innocence.
I have therightto the presumption of innocence. That means that if I wish to
contest the charge against me, I may enter a plea of "not guilty" and the matter will be
tried. At a trial, I would be presumed innocent unless and until the State proves my guilt
2

beyond a reasonable doubt. I waive thisrightto the presumption of innocence by
pleading guilty.
Rule U(eX3) right against compulsory self-incrimination.
I know I have the right to testify in my own behalf but that if I choose not to do so,
I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and further realize that no
adverse inferences may or will be drawn against me if I elect to exercise my right not to
testify. I also realize that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right against selfincrimination and am admitting that I am guilty.
Rule ll(eX3) right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.
I know that I have a right to a trial by an unbiased and impartial jury and that a
unanimous verdict would be required for a conviction on any count before a jury, and that
by pleading guilty I waive my right to a jury trial. I also understand that I have a right to a
speedy trial, one that is not unduly delayed. I understand that my trial, if I were to have
one, would be open to the public. I waive each of these rights by my plea because I will
not have a trial.
Rote ll(eX3) right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
I know that if I elect to have a trial, I have therightto confront and cross-examine
any witnesses who testify against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney.
Rule(e)(3) right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses.
I know that if I qualify as an indigent, I have therightto have my witnesses
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subpoenaed at State expense to testify in court upon my behalf I understand that I waive
this right by my plea.
Rule U(eX4) prosecution has burden and pleas are admissions.
If I plead "not guilty" the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each
element of each count beyond a reasonable doubt. X realize that by pleading guilty I
waive suchrights,and that by my plea I am admitting all elements of the offense to which
I am pleading guilty. I acknowledge that I am guilty of the crime to which I am pleading
guilty, and acknowledge that the court may find me guilty of all offenses to which I am
pleading guilty.
Rule U(eX4) elements of the offense
The elements of the crime of which I am charged are as follows:
Count I, a Class "A,f Misdemeanor: That on about or between February 1,1997
and January 10,2000,1 knowingly failed to provide support for my children, Joshua
and David Bickley, while they were dependant, under the age of 18 and in needy
circumstances or they would have been in such circumstances but for support provided by
a source other than myself or on my behalf.
My conduct that constitutes the elements of the crime charged is as follows:
Count I: During the period between February 1,1997 and January 10. 2000,1
was aware of my obligation, pursuant to court order, to provide monetary support for my
children, JOshua Bickley, who was bom on October 5, 1982, and David Bickley who was
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born on August 7,1985. During that period I should have paid $350.00 per month until
August, 1999 and $175.00 per month thereafter under the court's order. I had- sufficient
intuilie Of iesouiu& available OF tho capability during th§ period to contribute to the

^

support uffllychildren bat failed to make payments without good reason.
Rale 11(e)(5) the maximum sentences.
I understand the maximum and minimum sentence that may be imposed upon me
for this offense.
The penalty provided by statute for the offense in Count I, a Class "A"
Misdemeanor, is a term of incarceration of 365 days in the Salt Lake County Adult
Detention Center. I also understand that the offense carries a maximum fine of $2,500.00
plus an additional 85% surcharge.
I realize that the maximum possible sentence for the offense may be imposed
upon me by my plea of guilty and that the sentence for the offense may be for
imprisonment, afine,or a combination of both. I also know that in addition to the
imposition of anyfine,an 85% surcharge as required by §63-63a-l, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended* will be imposed and that I may be ordered by the Court to
make restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes.
Rule H(eX6) plea disposition terms and advice.
My plea of guilty is the result of a plea negotiation conducted between my
attomey, on my behalf, and the prosecutor from the Utah Attorney General's Office. The
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terms of the plea negotiation are as follows:
Terms
The State will move to amend Count I of the information to charge the offense alleged as a
class "A" misdemeanor. I will plead guilty to the Count I of the Information and agree that
total victim restitution be entered in the amount of mv obligation for child support arrears
that I owe for mv children, with the understanding that the amount of court ordered restitution
and monthly remain to be determined by the court.thu «miuiml turtou uiac"«ri

,^>^^

Advice
I understand that pursuant to 76-3-405(2Xb) U.C.A. 1953, when a defendant enters a
plea disposition and later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, the defendant and
the prosecution stand in the same position as though the plea disposition, conviction, and
sentence had never occurred, and the prosecution isfreeto file the charges that it agreed not
to file pursuant to the plea disposition.
I know that any plea negotiation with the prosecution is not binding upon the Court
and is subject to approval by the Court. I further realize that if sentencing recommendations
are allowed by the Court, including any promise or concession as to sentencing made by the
prosecutor, that such recommendations are not binding upon the Court. I also know that
any opinions which my attorney, any prosecutor, or any other person may have expressed to
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me as to what they believe the Court may do with respect to sentencing are not binding upon
the Court. Even though the prosecutor may make a recommendation, the Court does not have
to go along with the recommendation concerning the sentence, and I could still be sentenced
to the maximum.
Rule 11(e)(7) time limits for withdrawing pleas.
I have been advised of the time limits for filing a motion to withdraw my plea of
guilty. Specifically, under Section 77-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, a
request to withdraw a plea of guilty must be made by motion within 30 days after the entry of
the plea. I further understand that any plea may only be withdrawn upon a showing of good
cause and with leave of the Court and that any effort thereafter to withdraw my plea must be
by appeal.
Rule 11(e)(8) right of appeal is limited.
I know that under the Constitution of the State of Utah, if I were tried and convicted
by a jury or by a judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and that
if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the state as
required by law. I further understand that I am pleading guilty unconditionally and that I am
not preserving any issue for appeal. I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my
rights to file an appeal.
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No undue influence, no additional promises.
No threats, coercion, or unlawful or undue influence of any kind have been made to
induce me to enter any plea of guilty and no promises other that as set forth in this statement
have been made to me.
I understand this document
I have reviewed this statement with my attorney and I understand its provisions. I
have gone over it carefully and have asked my attorney to explain any words I may not have
understood. My attorney has done so and I understand the meaning of all the words and
phrases contained within this statement I am satisfied with this statement and plea
disposition.
I am 48 years of age; I have completed

_ years of schooling and I can

read and understand the English language.
I was not under the influence of any controlled substance, drug, medication, or
intoxicant when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not presently under the
influence of any controlled substance, drug, medication or intoxicant
I believe myself to be mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and the
consequences of this statement and the entry of my plea of guilty. I am not undergoing any
counseling or treatment mentally or medically, which would impair or prevent me from
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea of guilty or executing and filing
this statement.
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I understand that this document sets out the entire plea disposition between
myself and the State of Utah.
DATED this J^± day of Jtts^*!?^

. 2000.

ROLLO KENT BICKLEY
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney of record in this matter for ROLLO KENT BICKLEY,
the defendant in this case; that I know that the defendant has read the statement. The
defendant and I have discussed the statement. I believe that the defendant fully understands
the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent to execute it. To the
best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these,
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing
statement are accurate and true.

MARNIE D. FLORES
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the prosecuting attorney for the State of Utah against the defendant
in this case, ROLLO KENT BICKLEY. I have reviewed this statement of the defendant and
find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of the charge and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitute the offense, are true and
correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered
the defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement or as supplemented
on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would
support the conviction of the defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and
acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest.

^NICHOLAS J/ANGELffiES
/ Assistant ^rorney General

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and certification, and based
upon my observation of the defendant in open court together with his responses made in open
court to questions put to him by the Court, the Court finds the defendant's plea of guilty is
freely and voluntarily made with full knowledge of hisrightsand the consequences of this
plea. It is ordered that the defendant's plea of guilty to the charge set forth in the statement be
10

accepted and entered as indicated.
DATED this {<£>> day of l K & f c i L * > V W

M. STIRBA
District Court Judge
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